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The objective of this paper is to situate debates over the functioning and role of 
water markets within concepts of management and adaptation.  This paper will argue that 
existing water markets in South Asia are fundamentally different from the formalized, 
legal rights-based, water markets of the western U.S.  Existing “informal” water markets 
are neither inherently equitable nor inherently inequitable. Much depends on how equity 
is defined.  In most situations, only one dimension of equity: whether or not users have 
access to similar volumes of supply, is considered.  Other dimensions may, however, be 
equally important and lead to different perceptions of whether or not water markets 
contribute to the larger degree of equity within society.  Key dimensions of equity that 
need to be considered in any evaluation of the impact of water markets include: 
 
1. Access equity: the standard question of whether or not current populations have 
relatively equivalent access to the common heritage resource of water; 
2. Intergenerational equity: a more complex question of whether or not water 
markets encourage uses which contribute to the sustainability of the resource base 
and, therefore, maintenance of a common heritage for future generations.  This 
question is more complicated than it may seem because equity between 
generations is not just a question of the sustainable use of water but also involves 
questions of capital formation and transformation – i.e. social equity in future 
generations could be increased if unsustainable uses of water are used to create 
other (larger and better distributed) forms of social, economic or other capital. 
3. Intersectoral equity: This is a question of whether or not widely held views on 
how water should be allocated are actually present when water is used.  This may 
involve, for example, a question of whether or not all people have access to good 
quality water for fundamental survival and domestic needs or whether uses that 
have a lower social priority (such as industrial uses) are able to capture available 
supplies.  This issue is also present, for example, between urban and rural users 
and between agricultural livelihoods and industrial expansion. 
4. Broader social equity: This is a question of whether or not differential access to 
water over time allows better endowed sections of society to increase their rate of 
capital accumulation while less endowed sections remain at roughly the same 
level or decline.  In either case, the degree of differentiation within society 
between the “haves” and “have-nots” will increase over time.  Even in situations 
where everyone is better off in an absolute sense, the degree of differentiation 





Most discussions of equity in relation to water resources address the first, or at 
most, the first two dimensions.  Water markets may, in some situations, increase access 
equity (the first dimension).  How they perform on other dimensions is open to question 
and has not been investigated in a rigorous way.  It is clear that water markets do not 
capture in situ values (environmental values, sustainability, etc.) associated with water 
resources.  They do, however, play a valuable role by increasing access to water and the 
reliability of water supplies in rural areas.  While clearly imperfect, in urban and peri-
urban areas water markets are also an effective mechanism for shifting water from 
relatively lower value to higher value domestic uses while also forcing consumers to pay 
relatively high rates.  Water markets do create strong incentives for efficiency and water 
conservation at the level of individual users. Furthermore, unlike most urban water 
supply systems, where subsidies are captured by wealthy consumers with access to both 
storage and the piped system, water supplied through urban markets is unsubsidized.  If 
existing urban water supply systems can be reformed so that they deliver sufficient 
supplies to meet the basic needs of all sections of society, then existing water markets 
may be an effective mechanism for meeting the demand for more water services by the 
wealthy.   
 
Overall, existing water markets represent a partial, but highly adaptive, set of 
institutional arrangements for meeting the water needs of urban and rural residents.  This 
is occurring without establishment of a quantitative or other formalized water rights 
system that goes beyond basic rights of capture.  Approaches to addressing regional water 
needs and problems that recognize the role being played by existing water markets may 
be able to identify key points of leverage for meeting urban water needs without either 
fundamental institutional reforms or large-scale interbasin transfers. 
 
 
Water Markets and the Value of Water 
 
Globally, the last two decades have seen an increasing focus on the role of 
markets as a mechanism for allocating water and communicating its value to users. Water 
markets are, in many water management circles, seen as an important if not essential tool 
for reallocating water away from agriculture, the largest user, to meet growing urban and 
industrial demands.  More fundamentally, markets are increasingly seen as an important 
mechanism for communicating the economic value of water and, thus, for encouraging 
conservation and efficient use both within and between applications.   
 
Debates over water markets are often clouded by confusion over what is really 
being discussed.  The primary model for water markets has been that developing in the 
Western U.S.  This model involves a well established, though far from perfect, set of 
quantitative water rights systems and substantial government involvement in regulating 
transfers to avoid the above mentioned externalities and third-party impacts.  Although 




market activity involves the transfer of substantial quantities of water between 
institutional users – such as agricultural water districts and municipal water supply 
authorities.  The Western U.S. model is fundamentally different from the indigenous 
local water markets found throughout South Asia and many other parts of the world.  
Although often discussed using the same terminology, local water markets in South Asia 
are based on informal rights of capture (if you can physically pump or divert water, you 
can sell it), not on quantitatively defined rights systems.  They generally involve very 
local and volumetrically small, transfers of water between individual users (adjacent 
farmers or farmer-industrialist, farmer-tanker owner) rather than institutional users.  
Finally, because the markets are “extra-legal” governmental regulation of their 
functioning is minimal to non-existent. (Moench 1994) 
 
      Attempts are being made to replicate the Western U.S. model in locations such 
as Chile, Mexico and South Africa where legislation has been passed to reform water 
rights and, in some locations, to register wells.  The success of such approaches is widely 
debated.  As Carl Bauer (Bauer 1998)discusses in his well researched and documented 
book on the Chilean case, “Chile’s experience with free market water policies has been 
uneven.” (p. 119)  According to him, the new water code has worked relatively well 
within the agricultural sector – separating water from land ownership has enabling 
flexibility and encouraged consolidation of water user associations as separate entities 
from the state.  Major problems have, however, emerged with other aspects.  Equity is a 
concern since “Peasants generally lost out in the transition to the new Water Code” and 
there have been “serious problems” with “intersectoral relations at the regional or river 
basin scale” where the new legal framework has “done a poor job of coordinating 
different water uses and resolving conflicts between them.” (Bauer 1998)  On a more 
fundamental level, Bauer argues against the, often touted, proposition that “markets – as 
opposed to governments – are neutral, objective, and apolitical.”  Instead he makes the 
point that: 
 
“To exist and operate over time, markets depend not only on economic factors 
of supply and demand, but also on many extra-economic factors and prior 
definitions: such as political decisions, legal rules, cultural attitudes and 
geographic and environmental conditions.  These factors and definitions are 
affected by relations of social and political power and by the distribution of 
wealth.  Markets can be no more neutral than their surrounding social contexts 
and underlying institutional arrangements.” (Bauer 1998) 
 
      Finally, Bauer makes a point of great relevance to the South Asian situation 
when he points out that water rights and market based approaches are critically dependent 
on the capacity of the judicial system.  Because water transfers often affect basic 
livelihood and economic development questions and because water rights are extremely 
difficult to fully define, conflicts are an inherent part of any reallocation process.  As a 
result, “the capacity to resolve conflicts effectively and with legitimacy is especially 




rights and liberties and a minimal state.  This capacity depends on the judicial system 
which must control state regulation and balance different private rights.  The courts must 
be fairly independent from other branches of government, and willing and able to rule on 
disputes with substantive policy implications.” (Bauer 1998) 
 
      Bauer’s analysis highlights the importance of understanding basic market 
assumptions before entering any debate over the positive and negative aspects of water 
markets.  As Frederick indicates:  
 
“Two conditions must be satisfied for the development of efficient markets.  
There must be well-defined and transferable property rights in the resource being 
transferred, and the buyers and sellers must bear the full benefits and costs of the 
transfer.  Both conditions are now commonly violated for water resources.  The 
fugitive nature of the resource makes it difficult to establish clear property rights, 
and the interdependence among users might cause externalities or third-party 
impacts when the use or location of water is changed.” (Frederick 1996) 
 
            The above issues are, perhaps, particularly problematic in the case of groundwater 
resources.  With groundwater, benefits perceived by users are generally limited to 
extractive values.  In situ values – the maintenance of aquifer levels, the insurance value 
of water held in stock, and environmental values such as groundwater contributions to 
stream base-flows – tend to be public goods.  As a result, the value of these goods is 
generally not reflected in groundwater use patterns or prices (National Research Council 
Committee on Valuing Groundwater 1997).  In addition to the extractive – in situ 
distinction, definition of groundwater rights in a manner that is transparent and reflects 
third party considerations is particularly difficult due to technical limitations in the ability 
to quantify water balances and aquifer characteristics.  Groundwater is an “invisible 
resource,” and key aquifer characteristics including the amount of water available on a 
sustainable basis are often technically impossible to determine within the parameters of 
available data (Moench 1995; Burke and Moench 2000). 
 
Due to the above types of market failures, the effectiveness and equity of water 
markets as a mechanism for efficient, equitable and environmentally sustainable water 
allocation, is widely debated even in the Western U.S, the “type locality.”  Water markets 
in the Western U.S. have generally been thin – involving limited volumes of water and a 
relatively small number of transactions (National Research Council 1992).  There have 
also been major debates over impacts on the ability to protect instream flows, third 
parties including other right holders and areas of origin, and impacts on vulnerable 
sections of society including minorities, Native Americans and the poor (Nunn and 
Ingram 1988; Moench 1991; National Research Council 1992; Moench 1995).  
Conceptual concerns over the use for market frameworks in natural resource management 
have been expressed since such approaches were proposed.   In the early 1970s, for 
example, Schwab indicated that : “Profit-motivated behavior in a free market framework 




uncertain future for the more predictable present.  To protect society against the risk of 
future shortages and crises, there will have to be active government involvement…” 
(Schwab 1972).  Finally, there are ethical concerns about the basic premise from which 
water markets start, e.g. individual private ownership over what has historically been a 
common heritage and public resource (Moench 1995). 
 
In many cases, debates over water markets have become polarized along 
ideological lines.  Those who believe in neoliberal economic perspectives advocate them 
on principle with little recognition of the complexities Carl Bauer highlights in his 
analysis of Chile (Bauer 1998).  Many others criticize markets without providing any 
insights on alternative mechanisms that can provide the allocation flexibility and efficient 
use incentives markets enable.  Markets can be seen as filling a vacuum left by states, 
which are unwilling or unable to provide basic resources for their citizens.  They can also 
be seen as a framework for allocation that decentralizes decision making to the level of 
individuals and reduces the intrusion of bureaucracy into everyday life.   
 
The above debates, while important to recognize, will not be resolved in this 
chapter.  What we believe is important to recognize is the near universal agreement that 
changing economic and demographic patterns over coming decades combined with 
increased recognition of environmental needs will necessitate the development of 
balanced and flexible mechanisms for water allocation.  As a result, probably the most 
critical issues are not ideological but practical.  They include the following questions: 
 
1. Do water markets, as they currently exist “on the ground” in developing countries 
provide some of the flexibility and incentives for water conservation that will be 
essential to meet needs over coming decades? 
 
2. Are relationships across water transactions equitable or are they embedded in social 
relationships that create conditions for forced sales or other forms of inequity? 
 
3. Are major third party impacts evident in the functioning of water markets? and 
 
4. What should the role of governments and international institutions be in relation to 
existing, imperfect, water markets?  In specific, how much reliance should be placed 
on attempts to create the types of private rights systems and government regulatory 
frameworks that represent the essential foundation for formalized markets of the type 
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